Without free will, many of our ideas around human accountability are wrong. It seems downright absurd to hold people responsible for their decisions and actions, even though they could not have decided otherwise, even though they were not free of will. Since in a determinism everything that happens was already fixed at the beginning of time, freedom of will in this sense cannot be compatible with a determinism. But since freedom of will obviously exists and is a necessary precondition for responsibility, freedom of will and indeterminism must be compatible. This, however, is a fallacy. For while various forms of freedom are compatible with a determinism, in an indeterminism every form of freedom is impossible.
Until the discovery of quantum mechanics, modern natural science was strictly deterministic and thus not compatible with this idea of freedom of will. It was only with the "discovery" of quantum mechanics that natural science seemed to make freedom of will possible at all. Although deterministic interpretations of quantum mechanics also exist, many physicists today agree that quantum mechanics, even though it undoubtedly contains deterministic elements (e.g. time evolution, measurement process), cannot be interpreted exclusively deterministically. They believe that the world must be at least partially indeterministic.
However, this does not play a role in the debate about freedom of will insofar as freedom of will and indeterminism are incompatible for fundamental reasons, regardless of how quantum mechanics is interpreted.
Homunculus as autonomous originator
Even if quantum mechanics should indeed contain indeterministic elements, all other scientific theories are strictly deterministic ("determinism or indeterminism). There is therefore no serious doubt that the body of a nonvolitional living being obeys deterministic laws, i.e. that there is a strictly causal connection between the (physical) life of my grandparents (e.g. procreation of my parents) and me. This is hardly disputed even by evolution-critical religions that presuppose freedom of will and therefore assume that, for example, at the age of forty days, this body becomes "ensouled" (Eco 2014, pp. 120-130). According to this idea, a non-material and non-evolutionary soul somehow meets the material body from "outside" and takes on the role of the free-willed, indeterminate part of the otherwise strictly determined human being. The soul or a part of the soul, which is often also called "homunculus" - "little human being", makes the free-will decisions without itself being determined by natural laws. The homunculus is thus the autonomous originator of the decision relevant to action.
The idea described here presupposes a body-soul dualism that can be considered refuted and no longer plays a role in the natural sciences today ("body-soul dualism"). However, even if the dualism were correct, it would lead to serious problems around the question of free will.
According to body-soul dualism, the non-material and non-determined soul attaches itself to a material human body. It, or the "homunculus" understood as part of the soul, perceives by means of material sense organs, controls the body and makes the free-will decisions of the person comprising body and soul. The homunculus seems to pause, reflect on various arguments that speak for or against a decision, direct its attention to the person's feelings, and then make its decision without being influenced by anything and thus indeterminately. This decision is not an automatism, the outcome of which was clear from the beginning and thus determined, but the homunculus weighs up and decides completely freely. It is up to him alone what the decision will be. It could also decide differently if it wanted to, it is the autonomous author of the decision relevant to the action.
Problems arise with this idea, since memories, feelings and thoughts are very closely connected to the brain, as for example damage to the brain shows. Since the foetus to be ensouled does not yet have a fully developed brain, the homunculus would either have to "grow along" with the material brain or already be fully developed at the time of "ensoulment", which is obviously not the case. The homunculus would also have to have complete access to the brain, "read out" the relevant data there, assess this data and then be able to make a will-free decision. After the decision, it would in turn have to intervene in the neuronal networks of the brain, for example, in order to initiate a movement that is necessary to carry out the action for which it has decided.
Today, such an idea can be ruled out for empirical reasons. For one thing, there is neither a "docking point" between the brain, or body, and consciousness, nor does the interaction of brain and consciousness function in this way (Singer: Homunculus). Secondly, this interaction would have to consume energy and thus be measurable and empirically verifiable, which it is not.
In addition to these empirical problems, fundamental problems also arise around the god-like "homunculus", which as an "autonomous originator" determines events in the world without being determined. If the "homunculus" actually decided without being influenced, completely indeterminate, then there would be no cause for the decision and thus no reason. The decision would not be free, but absolutely random. The "homunculus" could weigh up the thoughts, feelings and memories, but since the decision would have to be made without a cause, these thoughts, feelings and memories would have no influence on the decision. The impulse as to which decision should be made would be random and thus precisely not free.
Principle of alternative possibilities
Identical circumstances
The fact that a decision made by a "homunculus" has nothing to do with freedom can also be shown by the principle of alternative possibilities. According to this principle, one can only speak of freedom of will if someone could have decided differently than he did under identical circumstances (e.g. Pauen 2005, pp. 106-110).
If, for example, I decided to study philosophy of my own free will, then as a free-willed person I could also have decided against this education. The decision was not already fixed at the beginning of time, but was "freely" made by me (as a "homunculus" and thus independent of material evolution). Since I wanted to do this training and no one forced me to do this training, I freely decided in favour of it and against an alternative training.
Underlying this thought is the idea that I could also have decided against philosophy education under identical circumstances. It was not the circumstances that led to the choice, but I made it completely autonomously myself. What is problematic about this idea, however, is the fact that under identical circumstances, the reasons that led me to decide to study philosophy would also have been the same. So if I had decided to study philosophy after a long period of reflection and "going within myself", as a person who is free of will in this sense, I would also have had to decide against it under identical circumstances - although I would not have wanted to do so under any circumstances.
For under identical circumstances, not only the reasons and feelings, but also my will would have been identical. In a decision that was clear to me and also felt particularly free, I would therefore not have wanted to decide differently "under any circumstances" than I did. If I had decided against studying in this (identical) situation, I would not have felt this decision to be free at all, but rather externally determined or random. The question of whether I could have decided differently under identical circumstances is therefore irrelevant, since I would not have wanted to do so under any circumstances.
But even if the decision had been anything but clear, a problem arises with the principle of alternative possibilities. If I had been completely indifferent in the decision and at the end of the decision-making process had put my cross under "philosophy" without any real conviction, then I could just as well have rolled the dice. The decision would then have been made by me and it would also have been free insofar as I would have made the decision. But the decision would not really have been self-determined, but essentially dependent on chance. One minute earlier or one minute later I might have decided against it. But if the decision had been made by me at that time, then it would also have come out identically in this case under identical circumstances - or I would not have made the decision myself. In contrast to the first example, minimally different circumstances would have sufficed to arrive at a different decision, but even minimally different circumstances are not the same as identical circumstances.
The demand to be able to decide differently than one did under identical circumstances therefore does not lead to more freedom, but to less freedom. Freedom of will presupposes that a decision is well-founded and that one therefore does not want to act differently. If the well-founded decision that corresponds to one's feelings were to turn out differently for no reason, the decision would be externally determined or random, but by no means free of will.
Defenders of the idea that one can decide differently under identical circumstances usually object that they could of course have acted differently in the same situation. They could have chosen "medicine", no one would have prevented them from doing so, and this was not already determined at the beginning of time. They certainly could have done so - if they had wanted to. The decision was theirs alone. As we have seen so far, there is an error here insofar as under the identical circumstances the will would also have been the same, respectively the "homunculus" that should have determined the will. That the decision could have turned out differently under different circumstances, on the other hand, is possible without any problems. However, also in a determinism, which is why the principle of alternative possibilities in an indeterminism does not bring any gain in freedom.
Can
However, the intuition of the compatibility of free will and indeterminism is not only about the fact that the decision was mine alone under identical circumstances, but in particular also about the fact that I could have decided differently in principle. I had the ability to decide differently. I might not have been able to row my arms and take to the air at the time of the decision, but I could have decided differently if I had wanted to. In a determinism, on the other hand, I could not have decided differently, since the decision had already been made at the beginning of time.
Here, too, however, it is a faulty reasoning. In an indeterminism, I might have decided differently under identical circumstances (at least that is the idea) - but under identical circumstances I would not have wanted to do so at all. If I had decided the way I wanted, then I would not have wanted to make a different decision under identical circumstances. The question of whether - under identical circumstances - I could have made a different decision is therefore irrelevant.
But if I had wanted something different, I could indeed have acted differently in the same situation - if one does not consider the "homunculus" as part of the situation. The question then arises, however, why the "homunculus" would have wanted to act differently and the answer is: either because there were reasons for it, which is a deterministic notion - or for no reason, i.e. by chance. The decisions would thus be neither self-determined nor free.
Control
The alternative to determinant causality is not freedom but chance. If something happens without a cause, it does not happen "freely" but by chance. Chance and free will are mutually exclusive, since the concept of free will also includes control. The "free-willed" person must control both the decision and the action. She must be the entity that causally makes the decision, but her decision must also be the cause of the action. An indeterministic world therefore does not lead to an increase in freedom.
This is also the reason why indeterministic interpretations of quantum mechanics do not help here. If free will were a quantum effect, the decision could in principle only be predicted with a certain probability and would not be determined in this sense, but the free-willed person would then not be the cause of the decision with his or her feelings, thoughts and memories. The decision would "obey" calculable (!) probabilities and not the preferences of the apparently free-willed person. According to the calculable probabilities, a certain number of decisions would also have to turn out differently than intended by the "free-willed" person: If they want one thing, but the "probability contingent" for it has already been used up, the other possibility would have to be chosen against their will (cf. also freedom of will and probability; probability: argumentarium).
Determinism with homeopathic doses of indeterminism
Another problem with indeterministic ideas is that they are not indeterministic ideas at all, but ideas of a determinism that contains indeterministic elements. According to this, the world functions deterministically for the most part, but also contains uncaused, indeterministic elements, contains elements of alleged freedom, but which would be elements of absolute chance.
From a human perspective, the past appears closed and unchangeable, a conception that corresponds to that of determinism. The future, on the other hand, appears open and changeable and thus indeterminate. But if we look back from the future into the past, almost everything can be easily explained causally, it is easy to explain how the past has determined the future, that the future by no means follows the past openly or even by chance. This obviously also applies to most supposedly free-will decisions. These are neither random nor indeterminate, but good reasons can usually be found that sufficiently explain a decision. This is also hardly surprising, since in view of billions of years of deterministic evolution, it would be more than surprising if a few truly "free", or rather "uncaused" human decisions of will were the exception to the rule, because indeterministic.
If one considers allegedly indeterministic human expressions of will as the only area of the world that is supposed to be indeterministic, these are, in relation to evolutionary development, homeopathic doses in a potency that even homeopathy can hardly reach. It is a typical human self-aggrandisement to believe that, as the only being, one can violate the laws of nature like a god (Nietzsche: Nullity of Man). Surprisingly, this arrogance also exists in the realm of religions, especially in Christianity, where man as the only being is supposed to be "more divine than God": the Almighty and Omniscient can and does know everything - but man can trick him with his freedom of will and thus make himself guilty towards God. But as little as man could turn against a God free of will, he can resist the laws of nature and suspend them of his own free will.
It should have become sufficiently clear by now that quantum mechanics does not provide a remedy here either. Freedom of will and indeterminism are not compatible, which is why indeterministic quantum physics would not bring any gain in freedom either. On the contrary, there are good arguments to suggest that the indeterministic interpretations of quantum mechanics are so popular not least because they seem to wrest the natural sciences from determinism and make freedom of will possible ("Quantum Physics).
Conclusion
The following argument in particular speaks for the compatibility of free will and indeterminism: since in a determinism neither a truly free choice in the sense of an "autonomous author" is possible nor the possibility exists to decide differently under identical circumstances, free will and determinism are not compatible. Since free will exists, free will and indeterminism must be compatible. As we have shown, however, these two conditions (autonomous author, principle of alternative possibilities) are also not compatible with indeterminism.
In an indeterminism, human beings cannot make "godlike", autonomous, self-determined decisions out of nothing that change the world and at the same time are free in any relevant sense. Nor does the possibility of deciding differently under identical circumstances bring more freedom.
For representatives of indeterministic forms of free will, such a conclusion is unthinkable, since they are convinced that without indeterministic forms of free will, neither law, morality nor religion are possible. Man would be degraded to a machine, human dignity an empty concept.
That this is not so is easily demonstrated by the fact that law, morality and religion exist in opposition to indeterminate free will. In fact, it is easily possible to justify legal and moral responsibility without indeterminate free will. For religious forms of responsibility, however, things look bleak: in determinism, we are still rightly punished for breaking the law, but we do not have to fear a world court that divinely or karmically evaluates our decisions, since contradictory indeterministic free will is necessary for that.
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