In the non-scientific (and partly also in the scientific) imagination, the past is supposed to be "determined" in the sense of unchangeable. But the future is supposed to be indeterminate in the sense of unchangeable. While it is impossible to change the past, it should be possible for people to choose from various "futures" (a term that, excitingly enough, does not exist!) the one they want to select. Man should therefore be able to determine which of various possible "futures" will become reality and which will be discarded. Once he has chosen a future and it has become the present and the past, however, there is only that possibility which has become reality through the human being. The present human decision is thus supposed to turn an open future into a closed past; the future, in contrast to the past, is not supposed to be determined but creatively shapeable by the human being.
This idea corresponds to our intuition for various reasons. No human being has ever succeeded in changing the past and it would also quickly lead to contradictions if, for example, someone were to kill their own parents before their own birth. Even if we would sometimes wish it, what has happened cannot be undone. But as much as we are convinced that the past cannot be changed, we are also convinced that the future is open, changeable and shapeable. The idea that what happens in this world today was already determined at the time of the Big Bang, that it was already determined that I am writing this text at this moment, seems too absurd to be true. For this would mean that the future would not be open and shapeable, but that every one of my actions, every one of my thoughts, every one of my decisions would have to be necessary, unchangeable and determined. But what would still distinguish a human being from a machine if human decisions, human free will, were already determined since the beginning of time and thus not really free?
Determinism
Science seems to agree that there is a causal link between the time of the Big Bang and today. Because certain conditions prevailed at the time of the Big Bang, the universe and the world developed in this way and not differently. If the conditions had been only slightly different, the world would look completely different today, there would be no humanity, no planet Earth, no sun, etc. Purely theoretically, according to this idea, causal chains (causality) can be traced back from the present time to the Big Bang. I exist today and am writing this text because my parents loved each other, because their parents and their parents etc. loved each other, because their Ur-ur-ur-ur...parents were Cro-Magnon people and because their Ur-ur-ur-ur... ancestors had come from the water to the land some 400 million years ago and and and. Conversely, this means that if an amphibian-like creature had not reproduced some 400 million years ago, if "my" Cro-Magnon ancestor had been eaten by a sabre-toothed tiger as a child, if my great-grandmother had chosen another man of her own free will, that I would not exist then and you would not be reading this text. This brief train of thought seems indisputable today in principle; the past determines at least certain events and situations of the present. Some things, if not everything, can theoretically be causally traced back to the beginning of time, which is why the past is "closed".
Pure forms of indeterminism
But does that really mean that it was already determined at the time of the Big Bang that I press these keys now? The idea of determinism asserts exactly this. Whereas determinism assumes that everything in the world is causally caused and therefore everything was already determined or determined at the beginning of time, indeterminism assumes the opposite thesis, i.e. that not everything is determined. The idea of indeterminism is thus obviously much more in line with our intuition than determinism. But while determinism is logically simple and unproblematic, indeterminism raises unexpected difficulties at second glance.
radical, irregular, absolute indeterminism
The radical form of indeterminism hardly knows any followers. While in determinism everything is determined, indeterminism basically means that not everything is determined, or in the radical form: that nothing is determined. In such an indeterminism, there would be no laws whatsoever that "held the world together". A world that is even remotely regular, like ours, where we can rely on the fact that night follows day and that the tram will still run reasonably punctually in a week's time, as long as nothing explainable has intervened, would be factually impossible in a radical indeterminism. There would be nothing to connect things within time, there would be no reason and no cause why the tram should still be a tram just one second later. If I were to press a button now in a radical indeterminism, in the next fraction of a second there would no longer be a button, if I were no longer present, everything would be completely different, there would be nothing that would still exist. And with that, of course, there would at most coincidentally be a world as we know it at one moment, but this would have disappeared again in the next fraction of a second.
In an irregular indeterminism, there would be no causality, no "because", no explanation of why something happens. Instead of causality, "absolute chance" would prevail (not to be confused with relative chance, where causes are only unknown). There would be no regularity, nothing would last, nothing permanent could exist.
regular indeterminism (probability)
The question therefore arises as to whether there can also be a mixed form between these two extremes (determinism and radical indeterminism), a regular indeterminism, which is based, for example, on "probabilities. Instead of what happens today already being certain at the time of the Big Bang, this idea is based on the idea that not all "futures" are equally probable. Thus, with regard to the past, we assume a probability of one hundred per cent - this can no longer be changed. The future, however, appears open to us, with some things seeming at least almost determined, others very uncertain. While we hardly seriously doubt that the sun will rise again tomorrow, we perhaps reckon with a fifty percent probability that we will be able to finish work an hour earlier tomorrow. On the other hand, we consider the probability that we will be swallowed up by the earth tomorrow for no reason to be close to or equal to zero percent.
But if we go back in time the day after next and review the previous day, the probability with which we judge whether we finish work early changes. In retrospect, the probability no longer appears to be around fifty per cent, but close to or even one hundred per cent, because that job came in at short notice or there was already nothing to do at three o'clock. If we calculate probabilities with regard to the future, they are at least often speculations that are strongly influenced by what we do not yet know about the future. The more information we have, the more clearly we can calculate the probability of something happening. Once it has become the present or even the past, the probability appears to be approximately or completely one hundred per cent both forwards (we mentally put ourselves in the past and look into the future) and backwards (we look from now into the past).
A regular indeterminism based on probabilities thus approaches determinism with increased knowledge, and there are many more arguments against an indeterminism based on probabilities (cf. freedom of the will and probability). Since the probabilities change depending on our level of knowledge, the question arises whether they possibly only exist in our imagination and are based on an erroneous assessment. Could it therefore be that the probabilities "objectively" always amount to zero or one hundred per cent (= determinism), but the world regularly appears indeterministic to us? However, anyone who recalls what consequences determinism would have for our view of the world (no real freedom of will, no real possibility of choosing one from different alternatives, no shaping of the future, man effectively as a machine) can hardly be satisfied with such a solution.
Partly determined indeterminism
Uncaused causer
Therefore, in connection with freedom of will, there is usually no talk of "pure" indeterminism, but of a mixed form of deterministic and indeterministic elements. We would like to call this "partially deterministic indeterminism".
This form of an indeterministic conception not only dispenses with probabilities, on the contrary, the possibility of being able to decide for or against something even against all probability is central to it. In this conception, too, the past is unchangeable, but the future is supposed to be "open" because "free-willed beings" like humans are supposed to be able to start new causal chains (causality) without being self-caused. In this conception, determinism applies to everything except the human will (and possibly other free-will beings). Everything is determined except for humans, who can start their own "creative" causal chains solely on the basis of their "free" will, without being caused. This means that a free decision of the will is not itself caused, but the expression of the will causally causes an action, which then results in further effects. The free expression of will, if it happens without a cause, also has no past and at the moment of the free expression of will something begins that had not existed before, but which in extreme cases will have causal consequences into the future. The free expression of will causes without being caused itself and thus enables the creative shaping of the future.
Uncaused decision maker
Even though this idea of an "uncaused causer" or "unmoved mover" is very often used, it is not entirely correct, at least in most cases it does not correspond exactly to what is meant by it. The idea is not so much that man can start a new causal chain by his will without cause, but rather that man, without being caused himself, can choose from various possible "futures" the one that is then to become reality. In this conception, one or more causal chains already exist over a longer period of time, the future course of which the human being can imagine and from which he can select, or has to select, one.
An example will illustrate this idea. I have been writing this text voluntarily for some time. So there is a causal chain, a causal connection between the beginning of writing and the current writing. One of the reasons I am writing at the moment is that I started writing this text a few days ago. I also have the choice at this moment of which of several possible "futures" is to become reality, I can (apparently) choose from various possible "futures": I can continue writing or I can get up, throw my laptop against the wall and henceforth not write another sentence. Both options have a past that can be causally traced back, but the decision seems to lie solely with me as to which of these options I choose. There seems to be no connection to the big bang, whether I choose one or the other. I decide freely without being caused, the choice does not appear to be determined, but the decision clearly has causal effects. For if I now write this sentence that they are reading, then I have decided to continue writing and thus I have ensured that this possibility has become reality and that they can now read this text. So their reading is causally connected to my writing. At the same time, I have decided against destroying my laptop and put this future possibility out of action, at least for the moment.
So my choice has decided which future has become reality. I am also at least firmly convinced that both alternatives would have been possible, even if the option of throwing the laptop against the wall seems to have been less likely. Nevertheless, against all odds, I could have done it if I had wanted to, it would have been a possible future that I actively decided against. I am therefore responsible for my decision and the decision was not determined, not determinate. At least I think so.
Objections against partly determined indeterminism
"Futures"
For first of all, the idea that there are different "futures" from which a person can choose is problematic. All these "futures" are mere possibilities, do not exist in reality, but only in the imagination, in fantasy. Man has the ability to imagine what the consequences of his actions will be under normal circumstances. He can speculate on various possible "futures" and direct his actions accordingly. He can set goals for himself in the distant future and make his decision dependent on such speculations. In our self-image, we humans select from the various imagined futures the one we want to become reality. Emotionally, we are convinced that we are actually choosing from various real possible futures, but in fact there is only one future - namely the one we decide on and which will become the present and the past.
The fallacy is that these "futures" are conceivable and also possible according to our experience, but for a future to become reality and thus the present, it must also occur. We therefore do not decide on a "real" future, but only on one of several "futures" that we have imagined, which exist only in our imagination. However, this imagination of different "futures" has an influence on how we decide. The imagined future thus becomes one of many reasons that influence decision-making. We then choose that "future" (that imagined possibility) which we believe promises us the most advantages, that it corresponds most closely to our thoughts, feelings, our will. This choice and the whole process of decision-making is of course real and takes place, we actually choose from various "futures" that we have "shaped" in our imagination. But this process is in turn causally co-responsible for the fact that precisely that "future" becomes reality for which we have decided.
Causer
When we look back on a past decision, there is little that remains "uncaused" about it, but at most unconscious. We can usually explain very precisely why we made the choice and if we cannot, then we usually do not believe that we made the choice ourselves, i.e. uncaused. Rather, we (unconsciously) invent reasons to convince ourselves that the choice was apparently caused by ourselves without cause, we justify ourselves for our decision, which just shows that we did not make it "absolutely by chance", but just well-founded.
And indeed, my decision to spare my laptop is of course easily explained. There were good reasons for it, and these reasons contributed to the decision. I am also very glad that I did not take the laptop and throw it against the wall without a cause, i.e. completely by chance, not even on impulse. If it had come to that, it would be of particular tragedy for me if I had to say that I had no reason to do it and could not explain it to myself. I would only have understood such a decision if I had good reasons for it and if it had been in accordance with my will. So for me to have felt the decision to be self-determined, it would have had to have been determined by my will. So was my will without a cause? But then it would not be my will! So it would not have to be my will that was without cause, but - me. But if I had decided without a cause, further problems would again arise:
- without cause always means inexplicable. In this case I would have decided what my will would have been, but the decision would not have been based on reasons, not in accordance with my feelings, but arbitrary.
- without cause means absolutely by chance. So I would have randomly determined this will and no other, without reason, without cause. But that is precisely not the idea at issue.
- If I want to throw the laptop against the wall, then I want to do that because it corresponds to me. Because it corresponds to my feelings, my thoughts, my will. If I made a decision that did not correspond to this, I would not experience it as free and self-determined. Only if the decision was partly caused by my own feelings would it be experienced as self-determined.
The core of the intuition around free will is that although we act in a reasoned way, an action was not determined, but that we chose the one "future" ourselves and without coercion (without being determined). We did this on the basis of our own deliberation, our own convictions and feelings - which is of course true. For this decision-making process was also a cause of our decision, was a cause of our having decided precisely for this possibility, for this (imagined) "future". Without a decision-making process or through a different decision-making process, we would have come to a different conclusion, the choice would therefore have been different. If we had been in a different mood, if we had been able to assess the consequences more accurately, if we had had different knowledge, we might have decided differently - and of course we could have decided differently. The point is, however, that at the moment of the decision we decided with good reasons for one and against the other "future" under the given circumstances. If the circumstances had been different, we might have decided differently. But the circumstances at the time led to our decision and the decision led to the action.
So it was actually we ourselves who made the decision. By imagining the "futures", by our reflection, by weighing up reasons etc., we ourselves influenced the decision, which therefore turned out differently than if this process had not taken place. After the decision-making process, we made the decision that corresponded to our will, that we wanted, and not the one that someone else made for us. In this respect, we have also brought about the decision ourselves - namely by the fact that our reflection and our decision-making impulse were causes for the decision. We have thus helped one of several conceivable and imagined "futures" to become reality and are thus responsible, on the basis of our feelings and our reflection, for this decision, for the fact that precisely this future has become reality.
Conclusion
When I have the choice between throwing my laptop against the wall or continuing to write, my decision is strongly influenced by the fact that I try to anticipate what consequences my decision and the subsequent action will have. In fact, I decide on a certain future course (to continue writing) and exclude other "futures" (throwing the laptop, cleaning up, possibly buying a new laptop, etc.). In this respect, I actually help to shape the future, I determine my future myself, because without my decision or if I had decided on a different (imagined) "future", a different "future" would have become the present and the past. However, this does not mean that the future is open, but only that the future is open in the human imagination, in the human fantasy.
Man lacks the possibility of knowing which future will necessarily become reality. However, he has the ability to imagine, on the basis of his previous experiences, which "futures" would be possible logically and according to the laws of nature, if he should decide in favour of this possibility. He also has the ability to integrate his speculations into his decision-making, which is why he can actually help shape the future.
Paradoxically, this freedom to shape the future is only possible in a determinism in which there is only one future and in which it was theoretically already certain at the time of the Big Bang what man would decide. The explanations mentioned in the text show that the idea of an "uncaused causer" must be an illusion: A lack of causality does not mean freedom at all, but absolute chance, and this cannot justify anything, including freedom. Moreover, both evolutionary theory and the big bang theory suggest that there is a causal connection between today and the big bang. This text has shown that this connection is not "determined" with regard to the past, but can be indeterminate with regard to the future. This is especially so because indeterminacy plays a role above all for free will, but it is difficult to imagine that evolution developed deterministically over billions of years (there was nothing that had a free-will choice) and that indeterminacy should have arisen with the emergence of the first free-will being. Especially since the feeling of indeterminacy can be explained deterministically without any problems - as can the interpretation of quantum mechanics ("quantum physics). That probability as a middle way is also no solution is shown in the following article: "Willensfreiheit und Wahrscheinlichkeit.
The absurdity of the idea that all free decisions are determined, however, can just as little be eliminated from the world. It can only be stated that anything other than determinism is contradictory (premises of science) and thus impossible. Absurdity may seem impossible or at least improbable to us humans, but that does not mean that it cannot be so. And if you take the theory of evolution to heart and are aware of the Copernican revolution, i.e. if you consider that man is biologically an animal living on a negligibly small planet in a huge universe, then at least the absurdity of the opposite assumption also becomes obvious to you: why should man in particular be able to cause things in this universe without being caused himself, when all the rest is obviously determinate?
The question remains how man then still differs from a machine, a robot, a non-volitional animal. The question remains how morality and justice can be explained in a deterministic world. The question remains how religion is possible in a deterministic world, which assumes that human beings are to be held responsible for their actions - which, however, have long since been determined. More on this: "Are free will and determinism compatible?